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With the increasing dependence of Hong Kong on China as a 
production base for its manufacturing industry, a large amount of Hong 
Kong manufacturers' capital has been locked into the economy of China, 
In addition to minimizing the economic risk of their investment in 
China, Hong Kong manufacturers also have to calculate the political 
risk they are facing vith a view of working out a set of business 
strategies to pursue vith their PRC investments. 
In this study, the views of local Hong Kong manufacturers in the 
two most represented industries, namely garment and electronics, 
towards extending their relationship with China are solicited and the 
strategies to be adopted to avoid political risk associated with their 
investments in Chins are ©xamined. Differences and comnionalities 
between the tvo industries are identified. It is found that although 
some strategies like relocation to other South East Asian countries in 
general are possible, these options are only open to large firms who 
have the financial capability of doing so. For the majority of small to 
medium sized manufacturers, maintaining or even extending their 
production in China remains the best possible option. The low 
production cost and short payback period for setting up their 
production base in China remains a major attraction to Hong Kong 
manufacturers and the economic benefits brought about by relocating 
into China still outweigh the political risk associated with this move. 
11 i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES • 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Chapter 
I INTRODUCTION � 
II BACKGROUND 2 
Economic and Political Relationship Between Hong Kong 
•and China 2 
Political Unrest in China 3 
Hong Kong Manufacturers ‘ Attitudes 3 
Garment and Electronic Industry 4 
III STRUCTURED AND UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 7 
Unstructured Interviews with Investment Advisors, 
General Traders 7 
Structured Interviews with Top Executives of the 
Glorious Sun Group g 
Structured Interviews with Director of Gold Peak 
Industries (Holdings) Ltd. - Chairman of the 
Electronics Sector in the Federation of Industries 
1987-1988 10 
IV LITERATURE SURVEY 13 
Definition of Political Risk 1 3 
Measuring Political Risk 14 
Classification of Political Risk 1 5 
Managing Political Risk 17 
V THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 20 
VI HYPOTHESIS 23 
VII RESEARCH DESIGN DETAILS 26 
Type and Nature of Study 26 
Study Setting and Time Horizon 26 
Unit of Analysis 26 
VIII POPULATION AND SAMPLE 28 
1 V 
IX SAMPLING METHOD 30 
X DATA COLLECTION METHOD 32 
Method 32 
Questionnaire Design 32 
Procedures 34 
Results of Pretest 34 
Revision to the Method of Data Collection 35 
XI INTERVIEW RESULTS 37 
XII ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 40 
Difference in Strategies Pursued between the Garment 
and Electronics Industries 40 
Difference between Short Term and Long Term 
Strategies 44 
Difference in Strategies between Small and Large 
Manufacturers 45 
XIII GENERAL ATTITUDES OF HONG KONG MANUFACTURERS TOWARDS 
POLITICAL RISK 43 
One-country Tvo-systems Concept 48 
"Open Door" Policy of China 48 
Special Situation of China 48 
Transfer Risk 50 
XIV WHAT BUSINESS STRATEGIES HONG KONG MANUFACTURERS WILL 
PURSUE 51 
Problems or Difficulties Faced by Hong Kong 
Electronics Manufacturers 51 
Strategies to be. Pursued by Hong Kong Electronics 
Manufacturers 51 
Problems or Difficulties Faced by Hong Kong Garment 
Manufacturers 53 
Strategies to be pursued by Hong Kong Garment 
Manufacturers 53 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Results of Telephone Interviews for the Garment 
Industry 38 
Table 2 Results of Telephone Interviews for the Electronics 
Industry 39 
Table 3 Difference in Strategies Pursued between the Garment and the 
Electronics Industries 41 
v i 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to take this opportunity to give our vote of thanks 
to Mr. Simon H.P. Chov, Deputy General Manager of the Glorious Sun 
Group, Mr. Paul C.W. Lo, Director of Gold Peak Industries (Holdings 
Ltd. , Mr. K. L. Wong, Director of Fedility Mercantile Co. Ltd. and Mr. 
Peter K.S. Ngan, Secretary General of The Federation of Hong Kong 
Garment Manufacturers for devoting much of their precious time in 
sharing with us their vision and their valuable experience towards 
investing in China during the face-to-face interviews, to various other 
manufacturers, investment advisors and general traders who have 
enlightened us in giving us their opinions and views towards their own 
company's future strategies, and to those top executives who have 
kindly responded to our telephone interviews. Last but not least, we 
vould like to thank Professor K.C. Mun for his guidance and advise on 
our work. 
S. S. Ho 




In the decade since China emerged from isolation, its burgeoning 
trade with the West has further lifted Hong Kong's status as a 
regional business and financial centre. Consequently, China has also 
relied on Hong Kong as the most important doorstep to attract foreign 
exchange investment and the associated entrepreneurship, management 
skills, marketing netvork etc. which are vital elements for its 
economic development and modernisation. 
But since the eruption of China's political instability in early 
June last year, economists advanced widely divergent views on how this 
intertwined economic relationship would be affected. Will the 
territory be able to regain its momentuni and secure an economically 
rewarding relationship vith China throughout the 1990's? 
More specifically, this research will try to examine the views of 
local Hong Kong manufacturers in the garment and electronic industry 
towards continuing their working relationship with China. Emphasis 
vill be placed on the strategies that vill be adopted by these 
manufacturers to reduce or avoid the political/economic risk of their 
investment in China. 
It is hoped that the results of our study will shed some light on 
the economic role and stance of Hong Kong that will have a bearing on 




Economic and Political Relationship between 
Hong Kong and China 
China's interest in attracting foreign investment on a large scale 
dates from the promulgation in late 1978 of its Four Modernizations 
Programme and the associated "open-door" policy. For more than a 
decade, due to its close cultural link and geographic proximity to 
China, Hong Kong's investment have surged up to account for more than 
one-third of the total foreign investment in China. 
Meanvhile, especially in the recent few years, the territory's 
economy has experienced spectacular high rate of growth. Despite its 
favourable effect, this has also resulted in an acute shortage of 
labour. Compounded vith the sharp rise in property prices, the 
production cost in many industries have increased significantly, thus 
impairing the competitiveness of Hong Kong's products in international 
markets. 
Consequently, many Hong Kong industrialists have transferred their 
manufacturing facilities into China through outward-processing 
arrangements involving sub-contracting, joint ventures and other 
methods of collaboration. Recently, this trend of relocation of 
industries into China is expanding rapidly and in addition to the 
transfer of assembling and processing operations, some industrialists 
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have begun to move the whole production lines into China. 
In fact, from a long term strategic point of view, it hae been 
suggested by Mclean (1988) that it ie a right direction for Hong Kong 
to gradually move out its manufacturing production to China to exploit 
the comparative advantages of cheaper land and labour cost there. An 
evolution process can then take place for Hong Kong to reposition 
itself from a manufacturing centre towards a major regional trading and 
financial centre. 
Political Unrest in China 
However, after the crack down of the political unrest in Beijing 
that occurred in June 4, local investors were shaken. On one side, 
manufacturers who have relocated most of their manufacturing base into 
China have survived the turmoil largely unscathed. China's land and 
labour have offered inexpensive alternatives and other intangible 
advantages to local industries that are hardly comparable. Local 
investors in general are also interested in the huge potential market 
generated by the over 1.1 billion population. On the other side, waning 
demand reported by importers and retailers all reinforce a profile of a 
community that is sharply tightening its belt. As many economists and 
businessmen see it, those incongruities underscore a paradox that seems 
likely to bedevil Hong Kong economy throughout the 1990's. That paradox 
is Hong Kong's economically rewarding yet politically perilous 
relationship with China. 
Hong Kong Manufacturers" Attitudes 
Despite the crisis in China, most companies in Hong Kong with heavy 
exposure in China expressed different views over continuing their 
working relationship with China immediately after June 4. Some of them 
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may carry a more pragmatic 'wait and see' attitude. Those inveetmentB 
which involve huge amount of money and focus on big infrastructura� 
projects such as those invested by international companies and large 
Hong Kong companies like Hopewell may express a more positive attitude. 
But complex political reasons combined with economic ones may underlie 
such undertaking. 
It is generally accepted that the industrial sector form the 
backbone of all economies. Comments of some of the well-known 
industrialists such as Tomei Industrial (Holdings), Video Technology 
Electronics, Cosmos Machinery, Lam Soon (HK) Group, etc. (SCMP Jun 7, 
1989) could be summarized as follows:-
(1) Joint Ventures in southern China were reported working as 
usual, however, with fear that unrest would spread to 
Guangdong province, plans for expansion in China will be 
frozen. 
(2) Existing operations will continue but reconsider deals in 
aspects such as withholding part of installment plan. 
(3〉 Pushing to decrease dependence on China by stepping up 
expansion of production bases in Thailand, Malaysia etc., 
places that are still enjoying Generalised System of 
Preference Status in the U. S. 
<4) Will be extremely cautious about entering new manufacturing 
agreements with sub-contractors. 
<5) Launch of pending investments would be delayed and spread out 
over a longer period i.e. the crisis has made timing a 
critical factor. 
Garment and Electronic Industry 
It is envisaged that there will be disparities in the views of 
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different investors in different industries on the risk reduction 
strategies to be pursued. It will be interesting to study the different 
strategies to be adopted by different industries. However, in order to 
control the scope of our research due to limited resources and 
manpower, we decided to investigate two of the most represented 
industries at the top of the domestic export profile of Hong Kong, 
which are garment and electronics. 
Garment industry has been the most important export earnings 
industry in Hong Kong for more than a decade and it still accounts for 
31X of the total export as at end of 1988. The industry is also the 
largest in terms of establishments vith more than ten thousand 
factories, accounting for 20.8% of the total manufacturing 
establishments. Garment manufacturers are among the earliest 
industrialists in Hong Kong to relocate into China to take advantage of 
the lov cost, abundant labour and export quota. Most factories have a 
high percentage of production base in China. Before, this industry used 
to be more of a labour-intensive and low technology type that suits the 
production environment conditions in China. 
Electronics industry is the fastest growing industry in the recent 
decade to become the second largest manufacturing industry in Hong 
Kong, accounting for about 257. of total domestic exports. According to 
the statistics from Hong Kong Trade Development Council, the industry 
is composed of small factories with 807. of them employing less than 50 
workers. There are currently about 20 electronics manufacturers listed 
in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Due to production cost savings and the 
availability of labour, over 90% of the local electronics manufacturers 
are now engaged in sorae forms of production arrangement in China. 
Therefore, it is anticipated the views of garment and electronic 
G 
manufacturers towards the current political climate and the future 
changes in the production environment could be very representative. 
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CHAPTER III 
STRUCTURED AND UNSTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Our research team conducted a couple of structured and unstructured 
interviews vith investment advisors, general traders, pioneers in 
garment industry and experienced big names in electronic industry. 
Unstructured interviews were mainly conducted with investment advisors 
t 
and general traders to tap some of their ideas on the general economic 
situation of the different facets of China business encountered 
recently after 6 wonths have lapsed since the unrest in Beijing. 
For the structured interviews, the research team deliberately 
arrange meetings vith high rank officials in the industry who actively 
participate in daily business strategy formulation. During the course 
of the interviews, ve tried to surface their opinion and views towards 
their ovn company's future strategy. PRC investment environment and 
prospects as veil as the business strategy followed by their fellow 
businessmen were also solicited. A brief summary of the results and 
findings organized under 3 target interviewee groups are as follows: 
Unstructured Interviews vith Investment Advisors, 
General Traders 
During the course of our interview, we addressed questions to China 
investment advisors and traders concerning their views on the probable 
change in general business strategies of Hong Kong manufacturers with 
PRC investment in the aftermath of the political unrest in Beijing. 
ft 
They expressed more or less the same kind of views and share eome of 
the opinions as follows:-
(1) Most of them agreed that probably over 807. of Hong Kong 
manufacturers have relocated into mainland China, though to a 
different degree. The main objective of relocation for Hong Kong 
practitioners was to get abundant supply of labor at a much lower 
cost. 
<2) For the middle and small manufacturers, they actually have no 
choice or alternatives but to relocate into mainland China for 
survival. Therefore, it is almost impossible for them to pull 
their investment out from China. 
<3) Going down to the opeorational level, some of the new problems faced 
and strategies followed by general manufacturers are: 
a) Even if Hong Kong manufacturers plan to expand or step up 
their China production base, they were not supported and were 
hindered by the still cautious and conservative views of 
bankers and financial institutions 
b) Real divestment to countries like Thailand or Malaysia was 
only possible for big factories who can afford the large 
amount of initial capital outlay or set up expenses. Some of 
the smaller factories have suggested that they might join 
together to form a stronger negotiation power with the host 
government. After then, each will develop their own business. 
But this proposal was only at a very primitive stage. 
c) The general payback period for Hong Kong manufacturers will 
usually be less than 3 yrs. There is rare chance especially 
for middle to small manufacturers to plan beyond 1997. 
d) They noticed that there was a general attitude change for most 
middle and small factories in making investment commitment 
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decisions. Before June 4, most of them are willing to risk a 
higher percentage of their assets in return for a higher 
reward. Now most of them will be more cautious, 
e) For long term planning, another alternative to divestment is 
to change the domicile of the holding company so as to make 
their present investments in mainland China as well as in Hong 
Kong, which is going to be returned to China soverignty, under 
the title of foreign assets. 
Structured Interview with Top Executives of the 
Glorious Sun Group 
The Glorious Sun Group first started in the 1970s as a small 
garment manufacturer and has now expanded into a consolidation composed 
of the whole line of business including textiles, manufacturing, 
trading and other related industries. The organization chart of the 
Company is shovn in Appendix 1. The annual turnover of the Company is 
over HKD 000 Mn. It established its first production base in China in 
the late 1970s and has thus established 7 different production bases in 
areas like Hubei, Beijing, Jiangsu, Liaoning and Huizhou. They have 
also set up different production bases in Indonesia, Singapore and the 
Philippines. 
Our interviewee commented that like most other large garment 
factories, they have already set up some overseas production bases and 
followed the strategy of vertical integration in their expansion, which 
implies that they could be flexible enough to shift their production 
when there is political instability in one of the locations. The other 
thing is that since they are engaged in the dyeing, textiles, garment 
manufacturing up to playing the role of trader, wholesaler and 
retailer, they are not only able to reap all the profit margins but 
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they could have the control of the export market network and the import 
of raw material, thus providing integrative impact on the host 
government economy by creating backward and forward linkage. According 
to the interviewee, after June 4, most manufacturers of the garment 
industry actually do not see any change in their normal operation in 
China and they vili continue with their production ae long as it is 
economically justified. 
Structured Interviev vith Director of Gold Peak Industries 
(Holdino) Ltd. - Chairman of the Electronics Sector 
in the Federation of Industries 1967-1988 
Gold Peak Industries (Holdings) Ltd. is one of the largest 
electronic products manufacturer publicly listed in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. The Company has been established for 26 yrs. Their products 
included battery, car audio products, car amplifiers, parts and 
components and electrical products together contributing to an annual 
sales turnover of HKD843 Mn as at the end of March 1989. They have 
established more than ten joint ventures in Huizhou, a city near 
Shenzhen in the past 5 years. The distribution and principal functions 
of the Company is shown in Appendix 2. They were among the most 
successful industrialists vith the ability to achieve breakeven target 
within six to nine months of establishment of the China ventures. The 
total production from their China based ventures accounted for more 
than 40% of their company total production. 
When we addressed the same question of whether our interviewee 
noticed any substantial difficulties or any change in business strategy 
after the June 4 event in Beijing for the electronic industry in 
general, his comment vas that most factories did not notice any new 
problems arising with their investment except that local sales to China 
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vas quite severely affected. Thie is mainly due to the credit 
tightening policy being adopted by China government recently. But 
then, since the electronic industry is basically export oriented in 
nature, most companies should be able to survive with their export 
earnings. However, there might be pressure from foreign buyers who 
were frightened by the political situation in China. Hence, larger 
manufacturers especially OEM factories were forced to look around for 
locations in other countries for suitable nev production bases. As a 
matter of fact, some of these new bases were only established as a 
selling point to comfort their foreign trading partners, thus implying 
that for economic reasons, China still remains to be their most 
important production base. 
On the other hand, small factories will undoubtedly have to rely 
very heavily on their production base in China. It is absolutely very 
difficult and expensive for them to pull out, reasons being: 
<1) Insufficient resources - the initial outlay cost to set up new 
production base in other South-east Asian countries is very high. 
It is out of reach of general small factories. Whereas after ten 
years of development, the infrastructure of China is more 
attractive with readily available factories elsewhere by having 
installed basic facilities such as electricity, water supply, 
communication network etc. 
(2) Difficulty of management and control - due to the proximity of 
China to Hong Kong, Hong Kong manufacturers could easily send 
technicians as well as managerial supporting staff to look after 
their production in China whereas it is expensive and time 
consuming to fly to other Southeast Asian countries. 
(3〉 Communication problems - most middle-aged skilled labor who are at 
the supervisors grade normally are not English speakers. The can 
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simply use Cantonese, their mother language, especially in the 
southern part of China to communicate with local workers. This 
will facilitate the transfer of technological knowhow and enhance 
staff morale. It is not unusual that Hongkong staff may 
psychologically resist going to a foreign place where they are 
unable even to speak the local language. 
(4) Presence of staff union - there is virtually no staff union in 
China. This is especially welcomed by small to middle factories. 
When they have to rush a big order, they can contract a few hundred 
to thousands of workers quite easily from China and then discharge 
them when the order is finished. This kind of advantage enjoyed by 




Political risk has been investigated and researched for a number of 
years and has thus become one of the fastest growing sectors in 
international business studies. With each additional international 
crisis, the demand for risk analysis proliferates. 
Definition of Political Risk 
Kobrin (1979) suggests that political risk implies "unwanted 
consequences of political activity". Risk brought about by political 
sources or environment has been defined as the chance, possibility, or 
probability of loss (Baglini 1976, 1983), as the probability of the 
future occurence of events or acts (Nehrt 1970; Overholt 1982; Poynter 
1984), as the (host government) actions adverse to foreign investment 
(Jones 1984), as potentially significant managerial contingencies 
(Kobrin 1982), as changes in the operating conditions (Jodice 1984), as 
probability that events, changes, and conditions will impact on 
business operations and goals (Lax 1983; O'Leary and Coplin 1983). 
Jodice (1984) says that political risk is distinguished from 
economic risk and social risk, but that at some point the 
distinctiveness of political risk disappears. Overholt (1982) denounced 
the attempts to distinguish between political and economic risk and 
empathizes the importance of political-economic integration. The 
results of their study indicates the close relationship of the 
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consequences of political risk on economic aepecte of investors. 
Although the consequences are usually adverse, changes in the p o l i t i c s� 
environment can also provide sources of opportunity. Despite the 
potentially severe consequences of political risks, Stephen Kobrin 
(1979) conducted a survey of how firms view and react to this risk. He 
found that managers considered political risk, typically quite loosely 
defined, to be an important factor in the foreign investment decision. 
Most risk analysis is superficial and subjective. The response is 
frequently avoidance vith limited information or data available. 
Buckley (1987) suggested that political risk took various forms, 
ranging from changes in tax regulations to exchange controls; from 
stipulations about local production to expropriations; and from 
commercial discrimination against foreign-controlled business to 
restrictions on access to local borrowings. He attempted also to define 
political risk as the exposure to a change in value of an investment or 
cash position because of government actions. 
Measuring Political Risk 
Despite the near-universal recognition among multinational 
corporations, political scientists and economists of the existence of 
political risk, there is no unanimity yet as to what constitutes that 
risk and hov to measure it. A number of commercial and academic 
political risk forecasting models are available. In sum, there are 2 
basic vays to approach measurement of political risk: the 
country-specific route (also called the macro approach) and the 
company-specific route (frequently called the micro approach). The 
main interest of our research is to study how firms that already have 
had foreign investments decide hov to structure its investment to 
minimize political risk. The configuration of the firm's investment 
will, in large measure, determine its susceptibility to changing 
government policies. Therefore, we will focus on the micro approach to 
study the different impact of political risk on different companies in 
particular industries. 
Classification of Political Risk 
Several schemes for the classification of political risk can be 
observed in the literature. Following the micro approach, we will focus 
on the type which attempts to classify political risks based on the 
structural and functional elements of an organization (Robook 1971; 
Root 1972; Lax 1983; Overholt 1982). As a matter of fact, the main 
theme of this project is to investigate how Hong Kong investors view 
political instability with respect to the functional aspect of a 
business organization. 
Through the pioneering work done on this subject by Franklin Root 
(1972), political risks can be classified as:-
(1) Transfer Risk - risk stemming from government policies that 
restrict the transfer of capital, payments, products, technology, 
and persons into and out of the host country. 
(2) Operational Risk - risk arising as a result of host government 
policies, regulations, and administrative procedures that directly 
constrain the management and performance of local operations in 
production, marketing, finance and other business functions. 
<3) Ownership Control Risk - risk brought about as a result of host 
government policies or actions that inhibit ownership and/or 
control of the local operations of an international company. 
Basing on such criteria, Overholt (1982) suggested that political 
risk can be classified as asset risk (threatening protection of 
assets), organization risk (similar to operational risk by Root), 
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operations risk (related to access to raw m a t e r i a � � r i g h t s of import 
and export) and market risks (threatening growth of domestic markets 
and fair competition, access to foreign markets). On top of the 
classification by Root, Lax (1983) further suggested 2 classifications, 
namely, administrative/ statutory risks (refer to change in the 
regulatory climate) and contractual risks (covers the bundle of 
supplies/price issues embodied in non-equity, non-service agreement 
transactions). 
To sum up, a review of the literature suggests that political risk 
is an applied issue and can be measured and analyzed in an operational 
aspect. Hence we attempt to define the dependent variable of political 
risk operationally under the 3 broad categories of transfer, 
operational and ovnership-control risk as follows:-
Transfer Risks - Tariffs on exports 
- E x p o r t restrictions 
- T a r i f f s on imports 
- I m p o r t quotas 
- D i v i d e n d remittance restrictions 
- C a p i t a l repatriation restrictions 
- N a t i o n a l i t y restrictions 
Operational - Price controls 
Risks - Increased taxation 
- E x p o r t commitments 
- L o c a l content requirements 
- L o c a l sourcing requirements 
- F i n a n c i n g restrictions 
Owner-control - Economic sector limitations on investments 
Risks - Abrogation of proprietary rights 
- F o r e i g n ownership limitations 
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- P r e s s u r e for local participation 
- E x p r o p r i a t i o n 
- C o n f i s c a t i o n 
Managing Political Risk 
Buckley (1987) suggested that political risk may be controlled at 
the pre-invGstment stage or in the course of operations, or both. He 
identified 4 approaches aimed at minimizing risk in the pre-irwestment 
period: avoidance, insurance, negotiating the environment and 
structuring the environment. In the course of investment which is the 
case in our research, Buckley suggested other operating policies such 
as: vertically integrated production (to keep the host government 
dependent on the investor for supplies, research and development and 
proprietary facilities etc.), single global trademark of product (that 
cannot legally be duplicated), encouraging external local 
shareholders, obtaining unconditional host government guarantees, 
planned divestnent, short-term profit maximization (includes policies 
of withdrawing Baximum amount of cash from local operation; keeping 
reinvestment to minimum; deferring maintenance expenditures and 
eliminating training programmed), changing the benefit/cost split with 
the host country (such as policies that ensure benefits accrue 
locally; training local workers and managers; manufacturing a wide 
range of products locally as substitutes for imports), encouragement 
of local stakeholders including customers, suppliers, employees, 
bankers and so on, and adaptation (to the potential risk of 
expropriation by formulating policies to earn profits by entering into 
licensing and nanagement agreements). Alan Shapiro (1982) also shared 
most of Buckley's findings and views. 
Schmidt (1986) indicated that the nature of foreign direct 
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investment can be captured in 2 sets of independent variables. The 
first set of variables, the general nature of investment, is cierived 
from production characteristics of the foreign operation such as 
categorizing into conglomerate, vertical and horizontal investments. 
The second set of variables, the special nature of investment is 
derived form the following attributes: sector of economic activity, 
technological sophistication and pattern of ownership. 
When considering the background environment of our research, a 
recent article by Brahm (1989) introduced several other techniques 
practised by Hong Kong and foreign investors in China to hedge against 
risk. These are: diversification, establishing Hong Kong company with 
limited liability and fail-safe planning. Fail-safe planning denotes 
designing corporate or trust structures to avoid situations arising 
from political instability. Common techniques include establishing an 
overseas company to function as a holding company for China activities 
or establishing a sister company that loan money by taking mortgage to 
the Hong Kong company in attempts to safe guard assets. 
To sun up, a review of the literature suggests that there are a 
variety of techniques and approaches that can be used to manage 
political risk when it arises and hence minimize the consequential 
loss. The fact that similar variables were surfaced in our 
unstructured and structured interviews reinforced our original 
thinking. After incorporating the specific environment between Hong 
Kong and China, a list of variables which may affect the political 
risk of Hong Kong investors with their PRC investment is given below. 
Hong Kong investors may adopt various techniques to change the 
magnitude of these variables, thereby reducing the political risk. 
- p e r c e n t a g e of production capacity based in China 
- p a y b a c k period for the investment in the PRC 
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- m a g n i t u d e of initial capital outlay 
- d e g r e e of insurance coverage 
- a b i l i t y to diversify to other related or unrelated business 
- a b i l i t y to adapt to changes 
- d e g r e e of vertical integration in the business of the firm 
- e a s e of substitution by Chinese counterparts 
- d e g r e e cf technological sophistication 
- p e r c e n t a g e of product serving the PRC market 
- d e g r e e of PRC participation in ownership and control 
- d e g r e e of capital repatriation out of China 
- e x t e n t to which the firm depends on local supply of raw 
material 
- e x t e n t to which the firm depends on infrastructures support 
. < 




After conducting a literature search as well as some structured 
interviews with a fev industrialists who have actual involvement in the 
field, a number of factors are found to have effect on the political 
risk faced by firms vith investment in China. These factors can be 
grouped into 3 different categories and the theoretical framework is 
depicted in Fig. 1. 
Some of these factors are found to influence the political risk 
faced by a firm by affecting the degree of exposure of the firm to 
political risk. For example, the higher the percentage of production 
capacity a firm bases in China, the greater the firm is exposed to 
political risk. Similarly, investments with longer payback periods or 
vith higher initial capital outlay will also make the firm more exposed 
to political risk. Firms with lower political insurance coverage, 
lower degree of diversification or firms that are less adaptable to 
external changes are also susceptible to political change. 
On the other hand, some of these attributes are found to increase 
the political risk by making the host government, China, more 
interested in constraining the business operation of the investment. 
The host government is less likely to subject vertically integrated 
investment to economic restraint by applying policy measures than they 
are to intervene in conglomerate investments, as vertically integrated 
investments often offer a substantial inflow of foreign capital during 
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start-up and are frequently export-oriented. Following the same token, 
if the majority of the product is ueed to serve the PRC market and the 
product can easily be substituted by Chinese counterparts, the host 
government will be more inclined to interfere as it appears that the 
firm is making private profit by exploiting the benefit of the host 
government population. On the other hand, the higher the level of 
technological sophistication is, the less likely the operation is to be 
a target of government constraints, as the host government will 
treasure the desired transfer of technological knov-hov to the local 
economy. Moreover, the pattern of ownership also counts. As local 
citizens often press their government to demand greater domestic 
control over foreigners, allowing a certain degree of local 
participation by various modes of joint venture can often be an 
effective means to minimize political risk. 
Lastly, some factors are found not to influence the firm directly, 
but the firm actually suffers as a result of its operations being 
affected by political instability. For example, the supply of locally 
sourced raw material may be so affected by social unrest or by a change 
in the policy of the host government that the production may have to be 
halted. Likevise, the dependence of the investment on local 
infrastructures support may also affect the degree of political risk as 
any social unrest may upset the transportation of rav material or 
finished product into and out of China. 
On the basis of the above arguments, we theorize that there would 
be correlation between political risk and each of the factors discussed 




In the theoretical framework developed above, the relationships 
between the dependent variable (i.e. political risk) and the majority 
of the attributes discussed above have been well proven in previous 
literatures. Positive correlation exists between the attributes and the 
dependent variable, political risk. This is also reinforced in our 
unstructured / structured interviews with practitioners with 
manufacturing bases in China. Hence, business strategies to be adopted 
by firms should be aimed at reducing the magnitude of these attributes, 
thereby reducing the political risk of the firm. The aim of the present 
study is to find out which of these business strategies are most 
pursued by industrialists in their investments in the PRC. 
It appears, from the interviews carried out, that the general 
payback period for Hong Kong manufacturers in setting up factories in 
China vill not normally exceed 3 years to guarantee return and to 
maximize profit in the short term. Therefore, it is expected that the 
risk associated with an investment with longer payback period or with 
heavy initial capital outlay will expose the firm to a much higher 
political risk. Hence, it is intended to examine the correlation 
between the payback period and the capital cost of investment with 
political risk in this study. 
From the structured interview carried out with industrialists in 
the garment and electronics industries, it is revealed that the garment 
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industry can be considered as a labour intensive one requiring � e s B 
capital investment when compared with the electronics industry. 
Although the electronics factories in China are usually set up for the 
manufacture of less sophisticated electronics items requiring a 
substantial amount of labour input, the cost required for setting up an 
electronics factory is nevertheless higher due to the expensive 
manufacturing plant required. Hence, it is expected that the degree of 
exposure to political risk is different between garment and electronics 
industries. It is postulated that the business strategies adopted by 
Hong Kong manufacturers vith their PRC investment will be different for 
the garment industry and the electronics industry. 
It is found that large manufacturing firms are usually not merely 
involved in production, but are at the same time participating in 
import/export, trading, marketing, wholesaling or even retailing 
business. Some of these firms even diversified to other related or 
unrelated business. As the profit made by setting up a production base 
in China may only contribute a small part to the total earnings of the 
firm, the impact of intervention from the host government on the firm 
may be relatively small. Comparatively speaking, a small manufacturing 
firm vith less vertical integration and with less diversification will 
be more susceptible to political change. Hence, it is also postulated 
that the strategies to be pursued by large manufacturing firms will be 
different from those favored by small ones. 
In light of Hong Kong's return to China in 1997, investors may wish 
to consider means of protecting their Hong Kong companies for carrying 
on China trade and investment in the long run. Hence, its is also 
postulated that the long term business strategies pursued will be 
different from their respective short term ones. It will be interesting 
to investigate the areas of difference. 
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The following hypotheses are therefore developed for this research: 
HYPOTHESIS 1 There is significant difference in the business 
strategies pursued by Hong Kong manufacturers with their 
PRC investment between the garment and electronics 
industry; 
HYPOTHESIS 2 There is significant difference in the business 
strategies pursued by Hong Kong manufacturers with their 
PRC investment between small firms and large firms; 
HYPOTHESIS 3 There is significant difference between the long term and 
short term business strategies pursued by Hong Kong 
manufacturers with their PRC investment. 
The difference in business strategies postulated in the above 
hypotheses have yet to be discovered in this research. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RESEARCH DESIGN DETAILS 
Type and Nature of Study 
The purpose of this research is to establish the relationship 
between the various attributes and political risk, and which of these 
attributes contribute most to political risk under different 
circumstances. It is hoped that, with this study, the most preferred 
ways of reducing political risk can be identified. 
Study Setting and Time Horizon 
In this study, the views of practitioners in the manufacturing 
industry towards the political risk associated with their PRC 
investment and their business strategies to reduce the risk will be 
sought. Hence the study setting will be a noncontrived one. The data 
for this research are to be collected over a 8-week period. Because no 
previous research has been done by the research team on this subject, 
nor is any subsequent extension of the research contemplated, the study 
is cross-sectional in nature. 
Unit of Analysis 
The research attempts to establish the business strategies adopted 
by manufacturers to protect themselves against political risks with 
their PRC investments. Hence, the unit of analysis will be firms 
registered in Hong Kong with some degree of production capacity 
relocated into China. Only firms in the garment and electronics 
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industry will be chosen as the subject of our study. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
Theoretically, it is possible to identify an exhaustive list of all 
the Hong Kong manufacturing firms in the garment and electronics 
industry that have set up their factories in China. Any firm that has 
set up a factory in the PRC has to obtain various approvals, including 
an approval from the Foreign Trade and Economic Commission. Hence, an 
exhaustive list of the identity of the foreign parties with their 
names, addresses and other information could ideally be obtained from 
the records of the Conmission. However, due to the subject now being 
studied is politically sensitive and due to some technical 
difficulties, it is impractical under the present circumstances to 
obtain such lists. 
An alternative approach to identify the sampling frame is to make 
use of the list of local manufacturers in the Directory of Hong Kong 
Industries (1989 edition) published by Hong Kong Productivity Council. 
This directory has been compiled on the basis of the latest list of 
local manufacturing establishments provided by the Census and 
Statistics Department and other lists of member firms maintained by 
Hong Kong Government and industrial organizations. The directory 
provides a detailed reference to over 5000 major manufacturing 
companies in Hong Kong. Information available in the directory includes 
the full names of companies, registered addresses and factory 
addresses, contact telephone numbers, names of proprietors or 
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directors, contact persons, employment size of the companies, 
production capacities, average annual turnover, paid-up c a p i t a� etc. 
The lists for textiles, wearing apparels and electrical (including 
electronic) machinery are used in this study. From various sources of 
information, it is estimated that more than 807. of Hong Kong's garment 
and electronics companies have operations in the mainland. The sampling 
procedure described below will be undertaken to extract the names of 
the companies which have relocated their manufacturing plant to the PRC 
from the directory in order to arrive at a representative sample from 




On the assumption that the manufacturers which have set up 
factories in the PRC are randomly distributed in the Directory of Hong 
Kong Industries, a stratified systematic sampling method has been used 
to obtain the sample as follows: 
(1〉 Extract the lists for garment and electronics industries from the 
Directory of Hong Kong Industries. 
(2) With the aim of obtaining approximately 100 responses and assuming 
a response rate of about 20%, a sample size of about 500 is 
selected from the list, with 250 firms selected from each industry. 
Since there are about 3800 garment firms and 1800 electronics firms 
in the directory, every 15th name has been chosen from the list of 
garment firms and every 7th name has been chosen from the list of 
electronics firms to form our sample size. Assuming that 80% of the 
respondents will indicate that they have some form of production 
capacity on the mainland, it is expected that 80 useful returns 
will be available for the analysis. 
(3) After the sample list is compiled, about 10*/., i.e. 25 companies, 
from each industry is be chosen randomly from the list for a 
pretest. Details of the pretest will be given in the following 
sections. 
<4) In the event that some companies contacted do not have any form of 
venture in the PRC, the company will be dropped and will not form 
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DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
Method 
Questionnaires are used as the research instrument in this part of 
the study. The questionnaires will be sent to executives who are in the 
position to make strategic decisions for their firms. To enhance 
understanding and familiarity to general Hong Kong manufacturers, the 
questionnaire has been written in both Chinese and English. The 
questionnaire has been designed to be straight forward, with close-end 
questions and is easily understandable. In view of the fact that 
executives responsible are usually busy, it is decided that a mail 
survey would be appropriate. A copy of the questionnaire is given in 
Appendix 3. 
Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire consists of three parts: background information, 
current problems encountered and business strategies. 
Part A: Background Information 
This part is devoted to obtaining the background and demographic 
information of sample firms. Information like the nature of business, 
the total number of vorkers employed, the percentage of production 
capacity based in China, the magnitude of investment in PRC and the 
average payback period for the investments in China will be elicited. 
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Part B: Current Problems Encountered by PRC Ventures 
After the political instability in China in June, the manufacturers 
may face a new set of problems that are unanticipated before with their 
investments in China. This part of the questionnaire is designed to 
obtain such information in helping us to assure the different 
independent attributes of political/economic risks as perceived by 
general Hong Kong manufacturers in the same section. The respondents 
are also required to rate against each of the possible problems the 
degree of seriousness that they perceive with their PRC investment. The 
respondants are also asked to indicate their level of confidence 
regarding their PRC investments. 
Part C: Business Strategies 
In this part of the questionnaire, we have used an exhaustive list 
of possible business strategies for reducing the political risk (which 
operate by reducing the magnitude of the contributing attributes 
identified as the independent variables in the theoretical framework 
given in Figure 1). The respondents are required to answer whether each 
of these strategies will be adopted by the firm to reduce risk. A five 
point scale, from 'certainly yes' to 'certainly no' is used. It is 
expected that, when such information is grouped according to the size 
of the firm or according to the type of industry, useful results as to 
what business strategies are considered to be most useful in reducing 
risk can be obtained. When these results are compared across different 
groups, Hypotheses 1 and 2 can be tested. Moreover, since the short 
term strategies will be expected to be different from the long term 
ones, both long term and short term strategies are requested in the 
questionnaire so as to test Hypothesis 3. 
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Procedures 
In the pretest, the questionnaire were sent to company 
representatives of each of the 50 firms selected from the sample list, 
vith stamped envelope and return address to encourage response. It is 
originally expected to amend the questionnaire according to the 
response obtained from the pretest and to issue the amended 
questionnaire to the remaining 450 firms. However, the results of the 
pretest has made necessary a major amendment to the data collection 
method. 
Results of Pretest 
Of the 50 questionnaires sent, only 2 questionnaires from 
electronics manufacturers were received, which represent a response 
rate of only 8X for the electronics industry and 0% from the textile 
industry. When investigating into the reasons for the low response rate 
by telephoning the manufacturers to which the questionnaires have been 
sent, it is found that the topic is considered too sensitive for the 
roanufacturers. This is especially true for the textile and apparels 
industry, which is comparatively speaking a traditional industry. 
Moreover, for those garment manufacturers who have relocated most of 
their production capacity into China, they are reluctant to disclose 
the actual production capacity of their factories in China. This is 
because these manufacturers are more or less infringing upon the rules 
governing the origin of production for exporting to the US or EC by 
relocating part or all of the production process into China and 
exporting the finished products as "made in Hong Kong". Although the 
Hong Kong Government has taken positive steps to curb this continued 
infringement of trade agreements, this is still prevailing in the 
textile and apparels industry and this poses a great impediment to 
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surveying using mailed questionnaires. A major amendment to the method 
of data collection is therefore necessary. 
Revision to the Method of Data Collection 
Before considering the appropriate amendments to the method of data 
collection, it is necessary to review the aim of our present study. Our 
original intention is to explore the business strategies pursued by 
Hong Kong manufacturers, in particular the two most representative 
industries, garment and electronics, for both small and large 
companies, to reduce the political risk associated with their PRC 
investment. Although the hypotheses presented in Chapter VI are 
centered around the difference in the business strategies pursued by 
different groups of Hong Kong manufacturers, emphasis should be placed 
on exploring the actual business strategies pursued by different groups 
of manufacturers in general and not on the difference itself. Although 
it would be best if the difference in business strategies can be 
established on a statistical basis by putting the hypotheses in Chapter 
VI to statistical tests, it would be as useful even if we have to limit 
our study to an exploratory one. 
After careful thought and consideration of the response from our 
pretest, it is decided that structured telephone interviews should be 
conducted. The main advantage of structured telephone interviews is 
that we can be able to explain to our interviewee the purpose of our 
study, clarify doubts and ensure that the responses are properly 
understood by repeating or rephrasing the questions. The number of 
structured interviews to be conducted is dependent on the time and 
resources available and such interviews can be stopped when we consider 
that sufficient information is obtained for the purpose of our study. 
The mailing list of manufacturers we have sorted out previously for 
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the mail questionnaires is used for our structured telephone interview. 
Names of firms are chosen randomly from the list and the directors or 
persons in-charge are telephoned to arrange for an interview. As 
expected, our requests for telephone interviews have also encountered 
rejection by most of the respondents on the ground that they are busy, 
or that they are reluctant to release information to outsiders. In the 
end, twenty fairly successful telephone interviews were conducted, ten 
for each of the two chosen industries and the results are presented in 
the following section. The questions listed in the questionnaire have 
been used for our structured telephone interview. Nevertheless, in 
order to limit the duration of each telephone interview to within 15 
minutes, which is a suitable time span in keeping the respondents 
interested in the conversation, only questions strictly essential to 
our study have been asked. As a result, our questions are centred 
around Q16 of the questionnaire and a couple of others concerning the 
background inforraation like the number of workers employed, the 
attitudes tovards the future level of investment in China etc. The 
questions given in Part B of the questionnaire regarding problems 
currently being encountered by PRC ventures as compared to those before 
June last year have been deliberately omitted as it can generally be 
established from the unstructured interviews conducted previously that 
there has been no significant change. Moreover, regarding the business 
strategies to be pursued in Q16, a three point scale using "will", 
•neutral" and "vill n o t � instead of the five point scale shown in the 
questionnaire is used in order to avoid complication for collecting 




The results of the telephone interviews, categorized by the type of 
industry, is summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
The results of the interview given corresponded quite well with the 
findings ve obtained from the structured and unstructured interviews 
conducted vith investment advisors, general traders and manufacturers 
in the garment and electronics industries earlier. Generally speaking, 
the continued reliance of Hong Kong manufacturers on the abundant and 
cheap production capacity available in China to support their 
industries and to •aintain their competitiveness in the world market 
has made Hong Kong inseparable from China, or at least, the southern 
part of China. Even after the turmoil of June 4 and with reduced 
confidence in whether China will continue vith its open-door policy in 
the future, Hong Kong aanufacturers can only continue, or even increase 
their investment in China in order to survive. 
Eventhough the nunber of samples collected in this exercise is not 
enough for hypothesis testing, some useful information can still be 
obtained when comparing the responses of the electronics industry with 
those of the garment industry. Both differences and commons in 
strategies to be pursued vere cited and analysed in the later chapters. 
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TABLE 1 
RESULTS OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS FOR 
THE GARMENT INDUSTRY 
Out of the ten firms in the garment industry surveyed in the 
telephone interview, the number of firms that will/will not pursue the 
following short term/long term strategies for their PRC investment are: 
SHORT TERM LONG TERM 
will will 
vill neutral not will neutral not 
1. divest to other South 
East Asian countries 1 0 9 2 3 5 
2. pursue political 
insurance coverage 0 0 10 0 2 8 
3. diversify the investment 
in PRC to other unrelated 
business 0 2 8 1 3 6 
4. increase the flexibility 
of the firm to changes 8 2 0 10 0 0 
5. integrate the business 
vertically to trading 
and retailing 5 2 3 5 4 1 
6. differentiate the product 
to avoid being easily 
substituted by local 
counterparts 4 2 4 4 4 2 
7. move production to higher 
technological sophis-
tication 2 1 7 4 4 2 
8. increase the percentage 
of production for export 
comparing to local domestic 
sales 8 1 1 8 2 0 
9. increase the stake of PRC 
partners in the investment 0 0 10 0 0 10 
10. reduce the amount of 
capital investment 0 2 8 1 2 7 
11. secure raw material supply 
by, for example, importing 4 3 3 5 4 1 
12. reduce the dependence of 
factories on local infra-
structural support 7 3 0 9 1 0 
13. reduce payback period 1 4 5 2 5 3 
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TABLE 1 
RESULTS OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS FOR 
THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 
Out of the ten firms in the electronics industry surveyed in the 
telephone interview, the number of firms that will/will not pursue the 
following short term/long term strategies for their PRC investment are: 
SHORT TERM LONG TERM 
will will 
will neutral not will neutral not 
1. divest to other south 
east asian countries 4 1 5 5 2 3 
2. pursue political 
insurance coverage 3 0 7 3 4 3 
3. diversify the investaent 
in PRC to other unrelated 
business 3 2 5 6 2 2 
4. increase the flexibility 
of the firm to changes 7 3 0 8 2 0 
5. integrate the business 
vertically to trading 
and retailing 2 3 5 4 3 3 
6. differentiate the product 
to avoid being easily 
substituted by local 
counterparts 5 2 3 7 1 2 
7. move production to higher 
technological sophis-
tication 0 3 7 4 4 2 
8. increase the percentage 
of production for export 
comparing to local domestic 
sales 10 0 0 9 1 0 
9. increase the stake of PRC 
partners in the investment 0 0 10 0 4 6 
10. reduce the amount of 
capital investment 1 0 9 1 4 5 
11. secure raw material supply 
by, for example, importing 8 1 1 8 2 0 
12. reduce the dependence of 
factories on local infra-
structural support 2 5 3 4 6 0 
13. reduce payback period 0 1 9 2 2 6 
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CHAPTER XII 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Difference in Strategies Pursued between the Garment 
and Electronics Industries , 
As expected, so»e differences are found in the strategies pursued 
between the garment and electronics industries and the differences are 
discussed below and are summarized in Table 3. 
Both garment and electronics industries have to relocate their 
•anufacturing base to China or to other South East Asian countries to 
reduce the production cost to remain competitive. In fact, the garment 
industry has found this need to relocate much earlier than the 
electronics industry. South East Asia has been chosen as the most 
suitable place to relocate in the 60's or 70's. However, since China 
opens its doors to foreign investments, garment manufacturers find it 
Bore economical to set up factories in China and this has ever since 
attracted the majority of the garment manufacturers into China. In 
fact, the considerations of garment manufacturers in relocating their 
factories are quite different from those of the electronics industry. 
Unlike the electronics industry, garment manufacturers are constrained 
by quotas and rules of origin. Except for those less developed 
countries where the export quotas have not been fully utilized, garment 
wanufacturers cannot easily relocate to make use of the cheap labour 
and rents available in these countries. So far, the majority of the 
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TABLE 1 
DIFFERENCE IN STRATEGIES PURSUED BETWEEN THE 
GARMENT INDUSTRY AND THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 
GARMENT INDUSTRY ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 
1. Relocation of factories is 1. Relocation to other South East 
constrained by availability Asian countries which still 
of quotas and rules of origin; enjoy GSP status is quite 
therefore difficult to relocate attractive to some large 
to other South East Asian electronics manufacturers, 
countries and is compelled to Overseas expansion is one of 
maintain or even expand the the possible strategies, though 
production base in China. existing ties with China will 
be maintained. 
2. Garment manufacturers prefer 2. Electronics manufacturers 
vertical integration to prefer horizontal integration 
horizontal integration. It is to vertical integration, 
possible to expand the business Electronics manufacturers are 
to trading and retailing in more prepared to diversify the 
order to reduce the dependence investment to other business of 
on revenue generated from related technology like toys 
production. and plastics industry. 
3. Garment industry depend heavily 3. The majority of the rav 
on China for supply of rav material for the electronics 
material. To reduce the risk of industry is imported and the 
irregular rav material supply political instability in China 
affecting production, increasing will not pose a serious 
the level of stock of raw problem regarding the supply 
material is one of the possible of raw material. 
strategies. 
4. Political risk insurance not 4. The possibility of buying 
quite appealing to manufacturers insurance to hedge against 
on the garment industry. political risk appears to be 
acceptable to some of the 
electronics manufacturers. 
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garment factories set up in China are for export to countries � i k e 
Japan where there are no quota restrictions, or for export to the US or 
the EC using the quotas for China. Nevertheless, a sizeable amount of 
these products produced in China are thought to have been transported 
to Hong Kong and tagged as "made in Hong Kong" for export to the US and 
the EC using the quotas for Hong Kong illegally. Because of the 
difficulties regarding the uee of quota, the relocation of 
manufacturing base is not easy for the garment industry. The investment 
environment in China (cheap labour, low rent and abundant supply of raw 
material) is so much more attractive than in other South East Asian 
countries that garment manufacturers find it economically not 
justifiable for divestment to other South East Asian countries. This 
explains why only one out of ten garment manufacturers surveyed has 
indicated his intention to divest to other South East Asian countries 
in the short terra even other the event of June 4. 
On the other hand, the electronics industry is more prepared to 
relocate to other South East Asian countries, notably Thailand. Out of 
the ten electronics manufacturers surveyed, four of them is considering 
divesting to other South East Asian countries. In fact, some of these 
South East Asian countries do offer comparable or even better 
investment terms than China. Thailand and Malaysia for example, still 
enjoy Generalized System of Preference treatment and the accompanying 
lower tariffs for exports to the US. Moreover, these countries have not 
been affected by the protectionist sentiments from major markets such 
as the US and the EC that are plaguing Hong Kong and China in the form 
of dumping accusations. Therefore, unlike the garment industry which 
vill continue to expand their manufacturing base in China, overseas 
expansion is considered to be one of the possible strategies for 
electronics manufacturers, although existing ties with China will be 
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maintained. 
Another difference in strategy between the garment industry and 
the electronics industry that can be found from this survey is that 
electronics manufacturers are more prepared to diversify the investment 
to other business with related technology, like toys and plastics 
industry. Out of the ten electronics manufacturers surveyed, three of 
them indicated that they have, or vill diversify the investment in the 
short terra and six of them will do it in the long run. In fact, the 
toys and plastics industries are quite related to the electronics 
industry in that roost toys are composed of electronic and plastic 
components and plastic parts are required for most electronic products. 
Moreover, the characteristics of the three industries in respect of 
production, aanagement, trading and marketing are quite similar, making 
the entry barrier for the manufacturers of one industry into another 
relatively lov. On the other hand, the garment manufacturers are more 
reluctant to enter into other business. Of the ten garment 
manufacturers surveyed, only three of them have plans to diversify to 
other unrelated business. After all, the garment industry is a more or 
less traditional industry with the practitioners in it more reluctant 
to attempt diversification. On the other hand, vertical integration to 
trading and retailing appears to be one of the more favoured strategies 
for large garment manufacturers when compared with the electronics 
industry. This is because the price markup from ex-factory to sales is 
usually very high conpared to the production cost for the garment 
industry and therefore expansion of the business to trading and 
retailing would be more profitable. 
For the garnent industry, timely completion of orders to meet 
tight delivery schedules is very important because the clothing 
industry is seasonal. Any delay in delivery will affect the customer's 
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sale campaigns seriously and would subject the manufacturere to heavy 
penalty. Timely completion of production would of course depend on a 
steady supply of raw material. In the past few years. Hong Kong 
manufacturers have depended on China as one of the major sources of 
supply of cloth and fabric for production in China, especially for 
garments aiming at the low end of the market. Ever since the event of 
June 4, the supply of raw material has become irregular and securing a 
steady supply of rav material has become one of the major concerns for 
garment manufacturers to reduce the risk associated with their 
investment in China. One way of achieving this is to source raw 
material from countries like Japan or Taiwan in case of shortage in 
supply (of course at a much higher cost). But a more favored strategy 
is to increase the level of stock of raw material to provide a buffer 
against shortage in supply. On the other hand, the majority of the raw 
material for the electronics industry is imported and the political 
instability in China will not pose a serious problem regarding the 
supply of raw material. 
Another interesting difference in strategies between the two 
industries is their attitude towards political risk insurance coverage. 
Although the concept of insuring against political risk has not been 
widely promulgated amongst Hong Kong manufacturers, three out of the 
ten electronics manufacturers did indicate that they were interested in 
exploring the possibility of buying insurance to hedge against 
political risk. On the other hand, none of the garment manufacturers 
contacted have interest in pursuing this strategy. 
Difference between Short Term and 
Long Term Strategies 
It can be observed from the responses to the survey that there is 
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little difference between short term and long term strategies. In fact, 
the success of Hong Kong manufacturers in competing with the rest of 
the world lies in the flexibility and adaptability of Hong Kong 
manufacturers towards changes in the world market. This is because the 
manufacturing industry in Hong Kong is dominated by a large number of 
small to medium sized factories who are interested only in investments 
of quick return and are constantly looking for niches in the market and 
are ready to react soonest possible. It is found in our study that 
three years is almost the longest payback period acceptable to Hong 
Kong manufacturers for their investment in China. Because of their 
limited capital and management capacity, these manufacturers are 
unvilling to over-commit themselves to any long term investment which 
vould result in a reduction in their flexibility to changes. Hence, 
vith the exception of some large manufacturers who can afford to do so, 
it can be said that long term planning is lacking in the manufacturing 
industry of Hong Kong. 
The question of long term strategies can easily lead people to 
think of the problem of 1997. When asked about whether 1997 will be a 
dividing line in their business planning, most manufacturers responded 
that vith the existing heavy investment in China and reliance on China 
as a production base, their life line has already been tied to the 
economy of China. The existing tie with China is already very intricate 
and it is virtually impossible to separate. It is the huge work force 
in South China that is supporting the industry of Hong Kong. Although 
the onset of the 1997 handover is a psychological barrier yet to be 
surmounted, it just makes no difference whether it is before or after 
1997 and the dependence on China will continue. There is no way for 
Hong Kong manufacturers to pull out of the mainland, as they have 
already invested too much in it. 
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Difference in Strategies between Small 
and Large Manufacturers 
Faced with mounting protectionism, increased competition in world 
markets, acute labour shortage and increasing production cost, a � � 
manufacturers in Hong Kong, large and small alike, are looking for 
possible sites for relocation of their production base. China, 
especially the Pearl River Delta region, has been the most favoured 
place for relocation. Until now, about 807. to 90% of the garment and 
electronics manufacturers in Hong Kong have engaged in some kinds of 
production arrangement in China. Some of the smaller firms have even 
relocated all their production capacity into China whilst maintaining 
an office in Hong Kong for marketing and trading. 
It is observed that the unrest in China last June might have 
fueled diversification in Hong Kong industrial investment to other 
countries, notably the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. However, the 
vievs of large and snail manufacturers are found to be quite different 
in this respect. For small manufacturers, what they want is a place, 
with abundant supply of labour and low rent where they can earn money 
out from investments and the benefits they are enjoying for their 
investment in China are hardly comparable elsewhere. It is financially 
not viable for them to withdraw from China and invest in other South 
East Asian countries so long as their factories in China continue to 
produce goods smoothly. Therefore, for small manufacturers, their 
strategies will still be to continue with their investment in China, 
though with more caution, after the turmoil of June 4. 
On the other hand, although the majority of the large 
manufacturers are still quite confident with their China investment, 
they are compelled to expand their production base in other South East 
Asian countries in order to maintain foreign buyers' confidence. The 
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clients are very concerned with continuity of supply. If the majority 
of the production capacity is maintained in China, the customers will 
feel uneasy. After all, it is unwise to put all the egge in one basket. 
Therefore, even if the production cost for setting up factories in 
Thailand or Malaysia are higher compared with their plants in China, 
large manufacturers are compelled to please their buyers by increasing 
their investment in South East Asia until the dependence on China has 
been reduced to a comfortable level. The capital tied-up in such 
relocation will be immense and is not affordable by most of the small 




GENERAL ATTITUDE OF HONG KONG MANUFACTURERS TOWARDS POLITICAL RISK 
One-country Tvo-systems Concept 
Since the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984, Hong 
Kong has been in a stage of transition because it will revert to China 
on 1 July 1997. According to the Declaration, Hong Kong will become a 
Special Administrative Region of China, retaining her capitalist 
socioeconomic system for another fifty years under one country, two 
systems. As such, Hong Kong people in general are facing a very 
peculiar event and expecting a change in sovereignty to take place. 
Within a few years from now. Hong Kong will become part of China. 
Consequently, Hong Kong manufacturers vill be operating under the PRC 
government and hence, their general concept of political risk may be 
quite blurred or rather more concerned with economic risk. The fact 
that our survey shows many respondents do not regard 1997 as a dividing 
line in strategy planning further support this point. 
'Open Door" Policy of China 
In the face of increasing competition from the other three 
dragons, as well as high land cost and scarce labor supply in Hong 
Kong, the only solution for most Hong Kong manufacturers is to shift 
their production base across the border. With China adopting its ”open 
door" policy, Hong Kong manufacturers can utilize the cheap labor and 
abundant land in order to remain competitive or strictly speaking, to 
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survive. Some people even commented that Hong Kong manufacturers were 
left with not much choice. They could either choose to go ahead with 
their investment or business in China or etay out of the business. As 
most of them have chosen to remain in the business, their success or 
profitability will have to depend on whether the "open door" policy is 
successful or if China will continue to adhere to that policy. Due to 
the fact that Hong Kong has been playing an important role as the major 
source of earnings in foreign exchange for China and the fact that 
China vill not want to see this mutual beneficial economic linkage 
being dampened and widened, most Hong Kong manufacturers by and large 
took a more optimistic view in further cooperation with China. 
Special Situation of China 
China is a large country populated with more than 1 billion people 
accounting for more than 25% of the world's total population. Within 
the nationality, there are different cultures and social practices with 
different dialects. The underdeveloped nature of the telecommunication 
system, coupled with stringent control by the government, has prevented 
free flow of information into and within the country. As many 
experienced China trader or businessmen have commented, it is very 
difficult to generalize situation in China. During the crackdown of the 
unrest in Beijing, much disorder and interruption to business 
operations was cited in the capital whereas in the Guangdong 
municipality, the city order was virtually undisturbed. Our survey 
results also indicated that Hong Kong manufacturers who had investments 
in the southern provinces generally agreed that the June 4 incident had 
no special bearing on their normal business operations. Furthermore, no 
nev problems were encountered as a consequence to the June event. 
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Transfer Risk 
When we study the major concern as well as the potential threats of 
political risk to Hong Kong manufacturers, it is found that among the 3 
broad categories, they are most concerned with the transfer risk. Most 
of them revealed that their worries included difficulties in getting 
their dividend remitted out, foreign exchange balancing, product 
marketability, maintaining a stable environment for production, 
maintaining an abundant supply of cheap labor and securing good 
infrastructural support etc. Most of them considered expropriation, 
confiscation etc as quite remote a kind of risk. It was also found in 
the survey that most respondents did not envisage any new problem 
arising after the June 4 incidence as compared to the condition before 
as far as the possible interruption to the operation of business on the 
production end is concerned. 
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CHAPTER XIV 
WHAT BUSINESS STRATEGIES HONG KONG MANUFACTURERS WILL PURSUE 
Problems or Difficulties Faced bv 
Hong Kong Electronics Manufacturers 
Hong Kong manufacturers generally have to face a lot of other 
business problems on top of the political risk associated with their 
PRC investment which is only one of the many factors affecting the 
business. The strategies to be pursued shall take into account all such 
influencing factors. From our analysis, these other factors include the 
acute shortage of engineers and skilled workers, fluctuation of Hong 
Kong dollar with respect to Japanese Yen, Korean Won and New Taiwan 
dollar, graduation from the US GSP status, dumping accusation by the 
EC, keen competition from Taivan, Korea and Singapore and lack of 
support from the government to improve the technology level of the 
industry. 
Strategies to be Pursued by Hong Kona 
Electronics Manufacturers 
According to a survey done by Hong Kong Trade Development Council 
(HKTDC, 1989), about 90% of the local electronics manufacturers are now 
engaged in some for«s of production arrangement in China. The total 
number of electronics establishments in Hong Kong as at March 1989 was 
1337. Most of the factories are small with 80X of them having less than 
50 workers. Despite the fact that there are only a small number of 
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large factories, they accounted for a high percentage of the total 
exports. Irrespective of their sizes, the strategies pursued by most 
electronic manufacturers with their PRC ventures in general are to 
continue with their investment in China to lower production cost. This 
is the most important strategy which may be considered as the 
fundamental. Facing the keen competition from the other three dragons, 
to be able to lover production cost will mean increased 
competitiveness. Due to cultural linkage and geographic proximity, 
investment in China is a very logical solution. Even after June 4 
suppression, most electronics manufacturers would not consider reducing 
their present level of investment in China. Some optimistic investors 
even consider expanding their production level in China. Nam Tai 
Electronics, one of the world's leading manufacturers of electronic 
calculators, is relocating most of its manufacturing operations of 
printed circuit boards to Shenzhen (SCMP Aug 12, 1989). Elite wanted to 
utilize and train technical graduates from colleges in China to cope 
vith their plan of relocating higher technological products into China. 
Tvo other examples of large firms deciding to increase their investment 
in China are ASM Pacific and Integrated Display Technology (Holdings) 
Ltd. One point worth noting is that most manufacturers will try to 
select the Guangdong area to implement their relocation plan, and this 
is in line with the desire of investors to invest in a more stable 
environment. It is anticipated that even if China remains politically 
conservative but is able to continue vith the "open door" policy and 
improve the investment environment, manufacturers are still willing to 
go there for investment. 
In line with the strategy of maintaining the production in China, 
the operation of electronics manufacturers in Hong Kong has to be 
adjusted to suit. Only those operations that are not labour intensive 
and require a high level of technology should be retained in Hong Kong. 
Those manufacturers in the electronics industry generally feel that 
whilst the majority of the production aiming at the lov end of the 
market should be shifted into China, local manufacturing techniques 
must go high-tech in order to compete with the other three dragons at 
the high end of the market. 
Problems or Difficulties Faced by Hong Kong 
Garment Manufacturers 
During the interviews, most respondents commented that in addition 
to political risk vith respect to production in China, the biggest 
threat to the garment and textile industry is undoubtedly the 
protectionist pressure. The Textiles and Apparel Act of 1987, though 
vetoed by the US President, sought to freeze US import at the 1986 
level. Quota problem and export country-of-origin restrictions has also 
limited the utilization of the cheap labor and land resources in China. 
Garment manufacturers can only legally produce nonquota items in their 
production base in China. 
Strategies to be Pursued by Hono Kona 
Garment Manufacturers 
Being the most important export industries for Hong Kong for more 
than two decades, garment industries has to face the quota problem on 
top of all other problems faced by other industries. The industry 
itself is quite mature with large factories having their investment 
diversified long before the event of June 4 to areas like South America 
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countries where they could still enjoy preferential treatment without 
quota restriction. Hence, garment manufacturers have a slightly 
different set of strategies. They will continue to expand the 
manufacturing base in China but with caution. As Mr. Kenneth Leung, 
Excutive Director of the Textile Council of Hong Kong commented, other 
industries can consider relocation easily, but the textiles industry 
has quotas. If an overseas buyer insists on Hong Kong products for 
exaraple, the exporter has no choice but to remain in Hong Kong. A 
partial solution to the problem is to finish part of the production in 
the nearby production base across the border. As revealed in our survey 
result, most respondents said they would consider expanding their 
existing facilities if it made economic sense but only in the southern 
part of the country which was least affected during the political 
unrest last year. 
In line with expanding the production base in China, it is 
necessary to diversify the market to nonquota restricted countries. 
With the opening up of the Japan market and the economic development of 
East European countries. Hong Kong market manufacturers will be 
actively penetrating into these new market. On the other hand, the 
operation in Hong Kong shall be improved for production of high 
value-added fashion to serve the market with quota restrictions, i.e. 
the US and the EC. 
CHAPTER XV 
CONCLUSIONS 
Individually, the two major industries in Hong Kong under study 
have different difficulties to overcome in order to remain competitive 
in the face of increasing production cost and keen competition from 
other countries. On the one hand, the garment industry is fairly 
constrained by the quota problem and can only relocate part of its 
production into mainland. For the production that has to remain in Hong 
Kong, moving up market may be the only solution. On the other hand, the 
major threat to the electronics industry is the mounting accusations of 
dumping launched by the US and the EC. With the removal of the GSP 
status, the competitiveness of the Hong Kong electronics industry at 
the low end of the market is seriously affected. Moreover, due to the 
lack of government support, the technological level of the industry is 
lacking behind most of the competitors and Hong Kong can hardly compete 
vith countries like Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore at the high end 
of the market in the long run if the existing situation is allowed to 
persist. 
The differences in strategies between the two industries in 
overcoming these difficulties, as revealed in this study, have been 
discussed at length in the previous sections. Yet apparently, both 
industries do share some strategies in common which we can generalize 
to get a feel of the strategies to be pursued by Hong Kong 
manufacturers in the 1990s in general. 
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Hong Kong manufacturers are in a peculiar position. The natural 
resources of Hong Kong is limited or in scarce supply. Hong Kong 
manufacturers have to rely totally on imported raw materials and even 
for labour supply, they have to depend on the huge labour force in 
China for their survival. Yet due to historical reasons, Hong Kong will 
be returned to China in 1997. So many Hong Kong manufacturers v i � 1 be 
facing a dilemma. Personally, most top executives and management staff 
of Hong Kong companies want to move out of Hong Kong and get a 
citizenship in Canada, US or Australia in the same way as many other 
Hong Kong people do in order to play safe. On the other hand, their 
companies have to remain in Hong Kong as service and support centre to 
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their production base in China. It is virtually impossible for them to 
pull out since continuing with the production in China is almost the 
only solution that is economically viable. 
Hong Kong is groving closer and closer to China and shall soon 
become one economic body. Although the political unrest in China has 
put fear into Hong Kong's manufacturers and is forcing them to reviev 
their strategies, prompting the industry to rush to automate their 
production in Hong Kong and to give serious consideration to divest to 
other South East Asian countries, it is expected that Hong Kong 
manufacturers will continue to increase their commitments or at least 
sustain the present investment in China. When the world economy begins 
its upturn. Hong Kong manufacturers may inevitably be forced to invest 
in China again in order to meet world demand. In summary, the 
inseparable relationship between Hong Kong manufacturers and the 
economic fundamentals on the mainland has not been undermined by the 
China crisis and the strategy of relocating the production base into 
China remains the most important strategy for Hong Kong Manufacturers. 
For those who do not have confidence in China, they would have already 
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decided not to relocate to China in the first place and wouid be 
suffering from keen competition from those who have relocated into 
China. In the end, they will not be able to survive or they will have 
to choose the cop-out strategy eventually and stay out of the business 
in Hong Kong long before 1997. For the majority who either did not have 
the ability to relocate elsewhere or decided to move forward under 
calculated risk factors, some of the strategies that they will adopt 
are: 
1) Hong Kong manufacturers will continue to rely on China for 
production of more basic items which are labour intensive to meet 
the demand from the low end of the market. Hong Kong manufacturers 
vill continue to maintain their close working relationship in the 
southern part of China and will put Guandong area even higher up in 
their priority list of choice for the relocation. 
2) The majority of small to medium sized factories will inevitably 
adopt a 'short payback policy with their investment in China. For 
the minority number of large factories, individual companies may 
have longer t e r � planning. With more abundant resources they can 
afford to diversify, to penetrate local market, to move to trading, 
retailing and marketing in order to broaden their sources of 
revenue and hence reduce the risk. With a few exceptions who have 
more confidence in investing in PRC, ve can safely conclude that in 
general all factories are very cautious vith their investments in 
China and a payback period of three years is a useful.guideline. 
3) Generally, different strategies such as increasing material stock 
level, vertical and horizontal integration etc. will be adopted by 
Hong Kong manufacturers in trying to stay flexible and to create a 
greater buffer in view of their heavy reliance on their production 
in China. 
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4) Hong Kong will continue to complement the production base in China 
vith modern management skills, industrial technology, bank 
financing and communication network with the rest of the world. In 
order to develop this complementary and cooperative relationship 
vith China, Hong Kong should concentrate on training people with 
commercial and industrial knowledge to cope with the demand from 
the production base in China. 
5) With relocation of the manufacturing base into China, Hong Kong 
will gradually evolve from a manufacturing centre into a servicing 
centre. Only those production processes that demand a high level of 
skill should be retained in Hong Kong. In order to win in this 
world of keen corapetition, manufacturers should not only aim at 
moving up market and produce goods of better quality in order to 
increase the added value of the products, but should also 
concentrate on improving the design and development potential in 
order to differentiate Hong Kong's products from the competitors' 
to cope vith the ever changing and demanding market. According to a 
survey conducted by Hong Kong Trade Development Council in 1989, 
the major functions of Hong Kong manufacturers in future to 
maintain the existing competitive position, in descending order of 
importance, are: 
- B u s i n e s s negotiation 
- M a r k e t i n g 
- D o c u m e n t a t i o n 
- M e r c h a n d i s i n g 
- P r o d u c t Design, R & D 
- T r a n s p o r t a t i o n / warehousing 
- Q u a l i t y control 
- T r a d e financing 
- D i s t r i b u t i o n 
- Manufacturing 
- Assembly / processing 
6) In view of the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, changing the 
domicile of the holding company may be a possible strategy. 
However, this can only be adopted by large companies which only 
amount to a small percentage in terms of the total number of 
manufacturers in Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong manufacturers have in the past accumulated a wealth of 
experience in management, marketing as veil as information gathering 
and application. The competitive edge of Hong Kong's industry lies in 
its flexibility and adaptability to rapid changes. The continued 
upgrading and improvement of these capabilities in the 1990's will be 
the major determining factor for success. 
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Re: Study on liusiness Strategies Pursued by Hong Kong 
Maim fact urers wi Lh PRC Investment in 1990‘s 
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敬 啓 者 ： 
閒 下 作 為 資 深 的 公 司 商 解 決 浪 人 员 . 我 n 彬 望 能 分 享 閣 下 作 出 莱 務 決 馆 考 
盧 的 究 ^ ^ 络 驗 。 我 們 是 中 大 三 年 制 兼 闭 士 S t程的學生。在閱建勒教授的 
抱 導 下 ， 我 們 擬 研 究 在 國 内 有 投 資 的 番 港 烧 家 對 中 港 經 濟 合 作 在 9 0 年 代 的 
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信 封 於 9 0 年 1 月 3 1 日 前 送 回 。 四 使 两 公 司 在 圃 内 没 有 投 資 ， 仍 該 在 下 面 
空 格 註 明 後 掷 回 。 




- 我 司 在 國 内 沒 冇 投 资 
- 本 人 祐 望 报 得 统 計 结 果 報 告 ， 諸 按 下 列 地 址 寄 送 。 
丨地址 ( 
香 潘 中 文 大 學 岡 肃 你 藏 贵 
fM 
注 息 ： 項 目 - - 指 外 方 在 圃 内 以 各 種 方 式 包 括 三 來 一 補 、 合 作 合 • 、 進 行 的 投 * 。 口 T ^：、貫 
Please circle only one nuiber c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the answer for 
each quest ion. 
講 按 毎 條 問 題 ® — 甸 相 對 選 揮 答 案 的 號 碼 。 
Part A Background Information 
甲部 背景資料 
Ql. The nature of business of your i nvestient in PRC is 
資 公 司 在 國 内 的 投 資 項 目 屬 播 一 鹤 行 茱 ？ 
1. g a n e n t and textiles 訪继成衣 
2. e l e c t r o n i c s 堪子 
3. others (please specify ： ) 
其他 （ 諸 説 明 ： ） 
Q2. The total number of workers employed i n your factories 
in PRC is 
貴 公 司 在 园 内 成 立 的 項 目 合 共 值 用 多 少 人 ？ 
1 . 50 or be low 5 0 ^ J^ T 
2. 51 - 200 
3. 201 - 500 
4. 501 - 1000 
5. above 1000 超 ig 1000 
. The total nuiber of ventures set up by your company 
up to date in PRC is 
資 公 司 直 至 目 前 為 止 在 画 内 共 投 資 了 多 少 智 項 目 ？ 
1. 1 only 
2. 2 - 5 
3. 5 - 1 0 
4. 10 - 15 
5. above 15 超 g l 5 
Q4. The production capacity of all your factories i n PRC 
account for hov luch of your coipany ‘ s total production'? 
5 年 、 司 在 圃 内 投 資 企 業 的 生 産 量 佔 賁 公 司 全 部 绝 生 産 量 的 百 分 率 為 
多 少 ？ 
1. below 20X 30% 以 T 
2. 20% to below 50X 20% M 50% JL^ T 
3. 50X to below 70* 50X M 70% j^i T 
4. 70* and above 70% 以上 
Q5. For how lany years have you invested in P R C 
贵 公 司 在 圃 内 開 始 投 資 至 今 已 多 少 年 ？ 
1. 1 ess than 1 year 少於一年 
2. 1 - 2 years 二 至二年 
3. 3 - 5 years 三至五年 
4. 6 - 1 0 years 六至十 _ 
5. over 10 years H jg -p ^ 
What is the p e r c e n t a g e of export to total sales of your 
p r o d u c t ion in PRC? 
貴 公 司 在 H 内 企 案 的 産 品 出 口 佔 該 企 案 绝 销 産 量 的 百 分 率 為 多 少 ， 
1 . below 30% 30% 以下 
2. 30% to belov 50X 30% M50% 以下 
3. 50* to below 70X 50X M 70% i^A T 
4• 70X and above 70% 以 ± 
0 7 . Do you plan to i n c r e a s e , reduce o「 keep the c u r r e n t level 
of investment in PRC? 
賁 公 司 是 否 有 計 霞 彳 增 加 、 减 少 或 保 持 目 前 在 國 内 投 資 的 水 平 ？ 
1. increase 增加 
2. reduce 减少 
3* keep the c u r r e n t level 保 持 現 在 水 平 
Vhat is the approx i aate p e r c e n t a g e of labour cost in the 
total product ion cost? 
賁 公 司 生 産 所 箱 工 资 佔 生 産 绝 成 本 的 百 分 率 為 多 少 ？ 
1 • below 30X 30X J^ T 
2. 20% to belov 50% 30* 至 50：^ 以下 
3. 50!^ to belov 70X SOX M 70% jk T 
4. 70X and above 70X 以上 
Q 9 . Vhat will you c o n s i d e r the laxiiun a c c e p t a b l e payback period 
^oi^ your coipany in e s t a b l i s h i n g a venture in PRC? 
資 公 司 1 2 為 在 國 内 投 資 項 目 可 接 受 的 最 長 還 本 為 1 n多 y 7 
1. less than 2 years 少 於 二 年 
2. 2 - 3 years 二 至三杀 
3. 4 - 5 years 四至五去 
4. 6 - 7 years 六 至 七 ‘ 
5. •ore than 7 years ^ ^^ ± ^ 
Q 1 0 . Vould you c o n s i d e r 1997 a critical dividing line in your 
b u s i n e s s p l a n n i n g ? 
資 公 司 的 業 務 策 略 有 否 考 盧 1 9 9 7 年 作 為 一 分 界 结 ？ 
1. yes 有 
2. no 否 
Q 1 1 . In s t r a t e g i c b u s i n e s s p l a n n i n g , what is the nu.ber of years 
二 ； 。 L f 化 敢 a ^ L h S f t - t e r ^ Planning for your c o i p a n y ? 
在 制 訂 f e 期 業 務 策 輅 時 ， 貴 公 司 一 般 界 定 為 多 少 年 ？ 
1. less than 1 year 少於一年 
2. 1 year 一年 
3. 2 years zi ^ 
4. 3 years 三杀 
5. others (please specify ： ) 
其他 （請説明： ） 
0 1 2 . How about the nuiber of years you c o n s i d e r as 丨ong-ter_ 
p l a n n i n g for your c o m p a n y ? 
在 制 訂 長 期 案 務 計 K 時 ， 資 公 司 一 般 界 定 為 多 少 年 ？ 
1. 3 - 4 years 三至四年 
2. 5 - 6 years 五 至 六 ‘ 
3. 7 - 1 0 years t 至十年 
4. o t h e r s (p lease specify ： ) 
其他 （講說明： ） 
Part B C u r r e n t P r o b l e m s E n c o u n t e r e d by PRC Venturp<? 
乙部 在 國 内 投 資 遇 到 的 困 難 
Q 1 3 . Please indicate the r e l a t i v e iuportance of the prob l e . 
e n c o u n t e r e d by your PRC f a c t o r i e s before June last year 
Most i m p o r t a n t , 1 二 least i m p o r t a n t ! please put a 
c i r c l e in the a p p r o p r i a t e p l a c e . 
譜 國 S 考 企 業 在 去 年 六 月 前 一 般 遇 到 的 困 雞 。 
如 為 非 常 重 要 ， 該 ‘ 囿 ， 5 , 如 認 為 不 璽 要 ， 請 ‘ 團 ， 1 。 
least BOS t 
i ipor tant iiportant 
不 重 要 非 常 重 要 
1. M o t i v a t i o n of Hong Kong e x p a t r i a t e s 1 2 3 4 5 
to work in PRC f a c t o r i e s 
香 港 俊 員 對 回 國 内 工 作 的 興 趣 
2 . s h o r t a g e of raw la ter i a 1s s u p p l y i p 7 ^ c 
原 材 料 短 缺 
3. lanageaen t prob I ei ] 9 7 a c： 管 理 問 題 i z J 4 b 
4. p r e s s u r e froi foreign buyers to 1 2 3 4 5 
shift product ion base 
外 商 要 求 公 司 轉 移 生 産 基 地 
5. excess ive b u r e a u c r a c y in PRC g o v e r n m e n t 1 2 3 4 5 
in a p p r o v i n g a p p l i c a t i o n s 
有 蘭 申 請 審 批 手 鑛 較 前 更 複 雜 霜 時 
6. insufficient RMB working c a p i t a l 1 2 ? 4 ; 
人 民 幣 流 動 資 金 不 足 
7. technical incapability of w o r k e r s i 2 ? 4 R 國 内 工 人 技 術 水 平 不 足 4 3 4 ： ) 
p a y i e n t s c r e d i t a b i1 i t y p e r i o d e x t e n d e d 1 2 3 4 5 
to PRC buyers lengthened for local 
sales 
圃 内 買 家 的 信 用 贷 款 期 蒋 延 長 
s u p p o r t froi PRC partners / local 1 2 3 4 5 
g o v e r n m e n t weakened 
圃 内 合 作 移 伴 / 當 地 政 府 支 持 則 弱 
f, / 
10. t r a n s p o r t and d e l i v e r y i o o 
* 物 付 運 拖 延 及 公 路 設 掩 不 足 〗 2 3 4 5 
11. w o r k e r s need to go to p o l i t i c a l s t u d i e s 1 2 ? 4 c； 
and a f f e c t p r o d u c t i v i t y 【 j 4 5 
工 人 箱 i t 行 政 治 . 擊 習 可 能 彭 皆 生 産 力 
12. c o i i u n i c a t i o n s , ^ o . 
通 訊 設 備 不 足 1 2 3 4 5 
13. c u s t o m s , _ ^ 
海 W 手 讀 繁 理 1 2 3 4 5 
14. labour supply s h o r t a g e i n -> . r 
努 工 供 應 短 缺 1 2 3 4 5 
15. e l e c t r i c i t y supply s h o r t a g e i o o . . 
菜 力 供 應 不 足 
1 6 . high u n e x p e c t e d / hidden cost (e.g. land 1 2 3 4 r 
〒 f e e , e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n c h a r g e s . 
e l e c t r i c i t y d e b e n t u r e etc.) 
• 5 2 S •，高（例如土地使用费’環境保護資’ 
17. o t h e r s (please specify ： 、i o 。 , , 
‘ i c 6 4 5 
其他 （ 誇 説 明 ： 丨 -
Q 1 4 . there .ight be s e e c h a n g e s in the 
！ 二 = 二 ： ” 二 = 二 ” PRC f a c t o r i e s located 
”!。了 二 ir r e l a t i v e ” 一 二 二 二 ? … “ 
J丨 : J e a s t i . P o r t a n t； please put a c i r c l e in the a p p r ; p r i a t e 
望 i 新 5 巧 • 巧 資 盒 ！ g S y 遛 『 當 - 〒 重 要 性 ， ㈦ 認 為 非 常 
least lost 
important important 
不 重 要 非 常 重 要 
】. aoti vation of Hong Kong e x p a t r i a t e s 】 2 3 4 
to vork in PRC f a c t o r i e s J t 4 i) 
香 港 傲 貝 對 回 國 内 工 作 的 與 趣 
2• s h o r t a g e of raw l a t e r i a l s s u p p l y } 9 7 a c 
原 材 料 短 缺 1 2 3 4 5 
3. l a n a g e ^ e n t problem ^ o -2 A c 
管 理 問 趙 i ^ S 4 b 
p r e s s u r e froi foreign buyers to 1 2 3 4 5 
shift production base 
外 商 要 求 公 司 轉 移 生 産 基 地 
5. excessive bureaucracy in PRC go vor n len t I 2 4 。 
in approving a p p l i c a t i o n s ) 
有 W 申 講 審 批 手 讀 較 前 史 後 雜 拥 時 
6. insufficient RMB working capital \ 2 d ^ 
人 民 幣 流 動 資 金 不 足 
7. technical incapability of workers 】 2 ？ 4 q 
0 内 工 人 技 術 水 平 不 足 ‘ q 。 
payments credilability period extended 1 2 3 4 5 
to PRC buyers lengthened for local 
sales 
圃 内 頁 家 的 信 用 贷 款 期 裔 延 長 
9. support f roi PRC partners / 1 oca I 1 2 3 4 5 
government weakened 
國 内 合 作 移 伴 / 當 地 政 府 支 持 則 弱 
1 0 . transport and del i very 1 p o 4 c 
貨 物 付 運 拖 延 及 公 路 設 施 不 足 ^ 
11. workers need to go to political studies 1 2 3 4 5 
and affect productivity 
工 人 裔 進 行 政 治 學 習 可 能 影 雄 生 産 力 
12. coiiun i ca t i ons 1 p ^ r 通 訊 設 備 不 足 ‘ z d 4 i) 
13. custois 1 2 4 c： 
海 簡 手 缠 繁 後 ^ ^ 
14. labour supply shortage 1 o q 4 c 努 工 供 應 短 缺 i z 4 b 
- 15. e1ectr ic itV supply shortage ] 2 3 4 5 
母刀 1 7 s S 小 
16. high unexpected / hidden cost (e.g. land ] 2 3 4 5 
use fee, environmental protection c h a r g e s , 
electricity debenture etc.) 
其 他 S i S 費 用 高 （ 例 如 土 地 使 用 費 . 環 境 保 護 資 ， 
電力公僙等） 
17. others (please specify ： ) 1 2 3 4 5 
其他 （ 講 說 明 ： “ ‘ ‘ ] 
What risks do you consider your PRC ventures will encounter 
under current political c 1 iiate and please indicate their 
relative likeliness to happen 
？ 公 S 气 S t ^ 投 資 的 項 目 會 遇 到 下 列 那 種 風 險 7 如 為 發 生 
. 可 能 性 極 高 . 請 ‘ 圏 ’ 5 . 如 認 為 可 能 性 低 者 . 請 ‘ 團 ， 1 。 
Probability 
® ^ 可 能 性 
low high 
低 蘇 
I. I n r r e a s e t a r i f f s o n e x p o r t s 1 o 4 
出 U 關 稅 增 加 I 、 1 > 
f/’ 
2. Increase e x p o r t r e s t r i c t i o n s 1 9 . , , 
出 口 限 制 增 加 ‘ ^ ^ ^ -
3. I n c r e a s e t a r i f f o n imports 1 9 , . ^ 
入 口 W 稅 增 加 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I ^ P o r t q u o t a s r e s t r i c t i o n s 1 9 , , . 入 口 限 額 I ^^  3 4 5 
5. D i V i d e n d r e m i t t a n c e r e s t r i c t i o n s i o o . . 
企 業 利 《 股 息 满 银 限 制 1 2 3 4 5 
6. [a 义 a 丨 r e p a t r i a t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n s 1 ? ? 4 c； 满 银 投 資 * 本 限 制 1 2 3 4 5 
S t r i c t e r price c o n t r o l s 1 o o , 广 
價 格 控 制 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Increased t a x a t i o n s 1 。 。 ， r 
稅 牧 項 目 及 百 分 率 增 加 1 2 3 4 5 
Local c o n t e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s 
包 含 酋 地 産 品 要 求 1 2 3 4 5 
ICL Local s o u r c i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s 
使 用 當 地 原 料 要 求 1 2 3 4 5 
" a n ^ ^ a c t u r ing r e q u i r e m e n t 1 p o . . 
規 定 産 品 必 須 在 當 地 生 産 1 Z 3 4 5 
1 2 . F i n a n c i n g r e s t r i c t i o n 1 � � ， r 融 資 限 制 1 2 3 4 5 
13. fea⑵继 ion on i n v e s t m e n t 1 2 3 4 5 
1 4 . 監 ⑶ = ^ 厂 i n v e s t . e n t 1 2 3 4 5 
15. li.itation 1 2 3 4 5 
J i ： local p a r t i c i p a t i o n 1 2 3 4 S 當 地 股 本 要 求 參 與 的 ® 力 i Z 4 5 
17. E x p r o p r i a t i o n 1 ^ o . -
政 府 沒 牧 企 業 歸 國 有 】 2 3 4 。 
18. C o n f i s c a t i o n 1 ^ o . 严 
政 府 揪 用 企 業 資 産 1 2 3 4 D 
19. O t h e r s (please specify ： ) 1 2 3 4 5 
其他 （！？^說明： ] 
/丨。 
Part C B u s i n e s s S t r a t e g i e s 
內 部 窠托策tS 
yil't 丄 e 厂 ur busi?『罕〒 s t r a t e g i e s in the short t e r . (ST) and 
in the long teri (LT), in r e s p e c t of your invest.^nt in PR「 
to avoid the risks s t a t e d in Part B above'^ ‘ 
， 公 司 在 分 别 制 定 短 期 及 長 期 臬 務 策 略 方 針 時 是否有採取丨 r列不同 
^ 5 有 . 1 1 ‘ 圈 ’ 1 。 並 講 注 意 長 期 及 鐘 岛 策 益 的 ® 別 ： ^ . 如 " ^ 定 
C e r t a i n l y C e r t a i n l y 
No Neutral Yes 
t t定没有 玲定有 
1. di ves t to other s o u t h e a s t j ST 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
asian c o u n t r i e s 
轉 移 至 其 他 東 南 亞 生 産 基 地 丨 L T 長 期 1 2 3 4 5 
2. increase p o l i t i c a l risk 1 S T 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
i nsurance cove广age 
增 加 政 冶 風 險 的 投 保 丨 L T 長 期 ] 2 3 4 5 
3. d i v e r s i f y the i n v e s t u e n t i n | ST 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
PRC to other u n r e l a t e d 
bus iness I LT 長朗 1 ? ？ a c 
分 教 國 内 投 資 至 其 他 不 同 行 業 丨 L i f e 期 1 2 3 4 5 
4. increase the f l e x i b i l i t y of 丨 ST 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
the f i n to c h a n g e 
增 強 企 業 面 努 環 境 改 變 的 揮 性 丨 L T 長 期 】 2 3 4 5 
5. integrate your b u s i n e s s 丨 ST 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
. vertically to trading and 
reta iling I LT -i- Ifl 1 ？ ？ a ^ 
结 合 與 公 司 行 業 有 期 連 菜 務 作 丨 L i 長 期 1 2 3 4 5 
垂直投資 
6. product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n to I ST 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
avoid being e a s i l y s u b s t i -
tuted by local c o u n t e r p a r t s | LT 長期 1 2 d R 
将 産 品 多 樣 化 . 避 免 被 當 地 生 産 品 4 5 
取代 
7. •ove p r o d u c t i o n to higher 丨 ST 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
techno logical s o p h i s t i c a t i o n 
S S S 透 科 技 水 平 ’ 以 播 得 ！ L T 長 期 I 2 3 4 二 
e 地 政 府 支 持 ‘ 
8. increase the % of p r o d u c t i o n | ST 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
for export coipar i ng to local 
d o m e s t i c sales 丨乙丁 長期 ] 2 3 ^ S 
增 加 産 品 出 口 . 避 免 依 钱 當 地 市 場 ^ 
9. increase the stake of PRC 丨 ST 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
partner in your i n v e s t m e n t 
要 求 國 内 合 作 彩 伴 增 加 股 本 丨 L T 長 期 1 2 3 4 5 
10. reduce the aioun t of capital j ST 短期 1 2 3 4 5 
i nvestient 
减 低 資 本 投 資 金 額 I L T 長 期 〗 2 3 4 5 
/ ) 
1 1 . s e c u r e r a v B a t e r i a l . s u p p l y ( S T te 8/1 1 2 、 ^ ^ 
b y f o r e x a i p l e i ^ p o r U n g 」 
增 加 入 口 原 材 料 比 例 以 保 范 供 g ； 及 j L T 長 朋 】 2 3 4 [ 企 業 曲 續 運 作 议朋 
1 2 . r e d u c e t h e d e p e n d e n c e o f I S T f e 朋 ] 2 3 4 ^ 
factories on local infra- “ 
str u c t u r a I s u p p o r t i L T g 斯 1 ? ? ^ c 
值 量 减 低 對 笛 地 基 礎 設 拖 的 依 糾 ^ b 
( 如 運 輪 、 屯 ， 通 訊 等 設 備 ） 
13. reduce payback p e r i o d 丨 ST 短期 i o 4 ^ 
缩 短 投 資 回 本 期 I L T 長 期 1 2 3 4 5 
14. o t h e r s (Please s p e c i f y ： ) 丨 ST 短期 】 2 3 4 5 
其 他 （ 請 說 明 - = = 二 二 丨 I L T 長 1 2 3 4 5 
- The End -
( 完 ） 
T h a n k s for c o - o p e r a t i o n ‘ ‘ 
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